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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
there is no constitutional prohibition against a state enacting
legislation to supplement the federal statute by permitting extradition on less exacting terms. Also, the federal statute prescribes only those terms upon which a state shall extradite, but
does not prohibit a state from voluntarily providing to extradite
under other circumstances less exacting.
The fact that an overwhelming majority of the states have
adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which allows extradition on an information supported by affidavit, is evilence
that it is necessary for the states to supplement the federal
statute in order to achieve a more cooperative effort in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective
criminal laws.
Indictment
It has been a long standing practice to include in the indictment, allegations charging defendant as a prior offender and receiving proof thereof at the trial, in order that the9 judge-can
impose proper punishment for a multiple offender. This obviously unfair practice will be allowed to continue unless abolished
by legislative action. This is stated by the decision in People v.
De Santis' where such prejudicial practice was held not to be
reversible error.
From this decision it must also follow that § 1943 of the Penal
Law passed in 1926, authorizing the District Attorney to proceed
by information after the conviction or sentence, to secure heavier
punishment, did not abolish the old method, but supplemented it.
In a dissenting opinion Julge Fuld reasoned that such a
patently unfair practice was upheld prior to passage of § 1943
of the Penal Law, because it was the only method by which a
heavier penalty provided for recidivists could be imposed. The
new method is fairer, accomplishes substantially the same purpose,
and should be used exclusively.
There was nolegal barrier for the'court to hurdle in eliminating this prejudicial practice, for no square holding on the intepretation of § 1943 had been previously made, although dictum in one
case11 stated that the "old practice is still permissible although
no longer necessary." However, the legislative intent in passing
this section would seem to sustain the majority, since the statute
9. People v. Sickles, 156 N. Y. 541, 51 N. E. 288 (1898) ; Johnson v. People, 55
N. Y. 512 (1874).
10. 305 N. Y. 44, 110 N. E. 2d 549 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 944 (1953).
11. People v. Gowasky, 244 N. Y. 451, 460, 155 N. E. 737, 740 (1927).
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was directed at proper punishment of a prior offender, where there
was no knowledge of the prior offense at the time of the trial. 12
The practice presently allowed prejudices the jury against the
defendant, without serving any useful function. The knowledge
of a prior conviction is necessary only after the conviction and then
merely to enable the trial judge to impose the proper punishment.
If the court does not see fit to eliminate this prejudicial practice
the legislature should act.
At The Trial
a. EvidentiaryRuling: The evidence allowed or denied admission at a tinal is in many cases the determining factor in defendant's acquittal or conviction. His right to a fair trial is protected against prejudicial error by the appellate court's careful
scrutiny of the evidentiary rulings objected to. Such a decision,
however, is usually of little precedent value.
In People v. Feld,13 the trial court admitted into evidence
imperfect recordings of a telephone conversation1 4 incriminating
defendant. The recording was marred by many interruptions
and contained defendant's name only once. The defendant contended that the recordings were mutilated or fabrications, and
tried to introduce testimony by a wire tap expert to this effect.
This testimony was denied admission, after evidence was admitted
to the effect that the expert could not tell if the records were
duplicates. or originals.
The Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision, ruled that failure to
allow defendant a chance to disprove the authenticity of the recordings was not prejudicial error. Since the expert had already stated
he could not tell if the recording were originals or duplicates his
further testimony would have been valueless.
The dissent vigorously claims that the destruction of the authenticity of the recordings would have gone a long way in destroying the People's case and failure to admit testimony on this
vital question should compel reversal and a new trial.
b. Testimom.y of Previous Identification: At common law it
was a well settled rule that an identification by a witness, of a
defendant at a trial, could not be further supported by testimony
12. See N. Y. Lacrs. Doc. No. 84 at 22 (1926).
13. 305 N. Y. 322 113 N. E. 2d 440 (1953).
14. CoDE Cam!. Paoc. § 813(a). The wire taps were made pursuant to an order

of the court.

